disengagements that are in effect and provides the basis for an assessment of effective truth-value" (Gupta 1999: 30) . So, with regard to its effective content, disengaged from its conceptual commitments to a geocentric view of the universe, the astronomer's assertion would be true.
Let the preceding remarks suffice as an exposition of Gupta's distinction and of the task it is meant to perform. We shall now proceed to a critical evaluation of it.
A consequence of Gupta's distinction is that one and the same assertion can be both true and false, depending on which of its two contents is considered.
2 This consequence is rather odd, and contrasts with the traditional view that a meaningful assertion can be either true or false, but not both. This view implies that an assertion has only one content, and this parsimonious position would seem to be preferable to Gupta's,
if not for other reasons at least as an application of Ockham's principle to contents: do not multiply them unless strictly needed. 3 The question is whether Gupta's distinction is actually needed. We will come to this later on. But let us now point to another consequence of Gupta's position, namely that truth-values proliferate along with contents.
Instead of two truth-values, true and false, we now have four of them: absolute-true, absolute-false, effective-true and effective-false, as they might be called. Again,
Ockham's razor would speak for the less prolific option. But Gupta's distinction would seem to face some additional difficulties.
In his (2006), Gupta sustains his distinction with the aid of three different examples.
One of them is the example of the astronomer, which we have already exposed. For our purposes, however, it will be better to start by addressing another example. Here it is:
respect, she is saying something false even if she actually is in pain. We think this consequence is not acceptable.
The stability of the content of many everyday assertions and its relative isolation from changes in our beliefs and inferences offers a standing common ground that makes critical evaluation and discussion of these beliefs and inferences possible. If content were pervasively affected by variations in beliefs and inferences there would remain nothing to be assessed for truth or justification. Ordinary content, which we capture in mutual understanding, has already been conveniently isolated from variations in beliefs and potential inferences of individual subjects. We do not get to it by a process of disengagement from general beliefs and conceptions: it is already disengaged, delimited and protected from those beliefs, conceptions, and their changes.
The relative stability of the level of content rests, to a large extent, on the fact that many basic terms in human languages are learned and transmitted in situations that include a direct perceptual contact with instances of the concepts expressed by those terms or expressions. Demonstratives play in many cases an important, even indispensable, role.
That those there in the night sky are stars is something on which ancient astronomers and laymen would agree with us, even if many of their beliefs about stars differed wildly from ours. It is this level of content, as we are characterizing it, that allows many assertions to be simply true, in spite of a subject's many false beliefs about the world. Imagine a member of an antique civilization who believes that stars are holes in the heaven's vault.
Suppose she says, "I can see lots of stars tonight". It seems that her assertion is simply true, no matter what else she believes about stars and no matter what stars actually are.
That from "I can see lots of stars tonight" she is prepared to infer "I can see lots of holes in the heaven's vault tonight," which is false, shows only that her belief that stars are such holes is false, but not that her initial assertion is false as well. It is hard to see how we could so much as identify her beliefs about stars and assess them as false unless we shared with her this background level of content, in which ostension and direct relations of reference play a central role. The content we share with our ancient hero is significantly isolated from higher theoretical beliefs and concepts, and defers to the true nature, whatever this may be, of the ostended thing, instead of deferring to additional theoretical beliefs and commitments. This is why our subject would not recoil from her assertion that she could see lots of stars at night after coming to know that stars are not holes in the heaven's vault.
We can now come back to Gupta's example of the astronomer who asserts, "The Sun is in the constellation Capricorn today." This assertion stands at a higher theoretical level than the assertion of our other subject that she could see lots of stars. Even so, we tend to think that the assertion has only one content and is simply true. We agree that many of the presuppositions and implications of this assertion for the astronomer are false. We still think, however, that these assumptions and inferences are not part of the content of his initial assertion. If they were, he would be irrational if he did not revise his view of that assertion's truth-value after being told about the falsity of those assumptions.
And it is not clear that he was rationally obliged to bring about such a revision. Whether the Sun moves around the Earth or not, its position relative to the Earth is correctly stated by the astronomer; and the stars forming Capricorn continue to do so even if they are not in the same spherical surface. Relative to the Earth, the Sun appears over a background area where Capricorn could be seen if it were dark. The astronomer is speaking about the Sun's position relative to the Earth, for he would accept that the Sun might not be in
Capricorn if seen from, say, Venus. And, whether or not the Sun moves, whether or not the celestial sphere exists, he speaks truly about that position. The reference of "the Sun" and even of "Capricorn" is fixed by ostensive and perceptual means, in relative what concerns its absolute content, is false. This, we may agree, is a strange result, for A looks just true, no matter what else can be true of that man. Gupta will assess A as true for what respects its effective content, which is obtained by disengaging it from (some of) its inferential connections. But it seems that no such disengagement is needed for this assessment. Fred's false belief about the identity of the man he is looking at and Mary's husband does not make "this man" refer to Mary's husband, and this is why Fred's (potential) assertion or thought, "This man is kind to her," is true. Concerning C, the intuitively correct verdict, as we said, is that it is just false. This does not mean, however, that someone in the communicative context at hand will not plausibly infer, from Fred's assertion that C, the true information that the man in question is kind to Mary, even if he knows that the man is not Mary's husband and so that Fred's assertion is, strictly speaking, false. From Gupta's perspective, however, C would be false in its absolute content and true in its effective content. This, again, is a very strange result, for Mary's husband is not kind to her and so there seems to be no plausible sense in which the claim that Mary's husband is kind to her is true.
Concerning assertions about sense-data, we also think that the distinction is not needed. A plausible interpretation of these cases may be the following. Suppose that sense-data do not actually exist. If so, then an expression like "that orange sense-datum" fails to refer and the assertion: "That orange sense-datum is oval," cannot be true. This, however, does not mean that it cannot convey, in a particular communicative context, the true information that a particular orange thing down there is, or looks, oval.
As we have tried to argue, then, the intuitions Gupta intends to capture with the distinction between absolute and effective content can be accounted for without it, and so without the corresponding costs that we have pointed to in this paper.
